DHC-1 Loses Engine Power on Final Approach at East Troy, Wisconsin; Corroded Fuel Gauge Cited in NTSB Report

A de Havilland DHC-1 lost total engine power on final approach to the airport in East Troy, Wisconsin, and made a forced landing short of the runway, according to a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident report from November 2024. The pilot sustained minor injuries, and the aircraft's wings and fuselage were substantially damaged.

During the preflight inspection, the pilot said he found three gallons in the left wing tank and four gallons in the right, against a capacity of nine gallons per tank. He judged the quantity from the fuel gauges and by looking into each tank to see whether it was wetted. He departed, performed one touch-and-go landing, flew about three miles west and performed two steep turns, then returned to the airport. On the downwind leg, the left gauge indicated two gallons and the right indicated three gallons.

On final approach at about 250 to 300 feet AGL, the engine lost total power. The pilot changed the fuel tank selector, but power was not restored, and he force-landed about 300 to 400 feet short of the runway.

Post-accident examination found the fuel selector in the right wing tank position. The aircraft has direct-reading fuel gauges at the inboard left and right wings, next to each filler port, and both read zero at the accident site. The left tank was empty and the right tank held about 1.5 gallons. No fuel leaks were found in either tank, and no fuel was present at the carburetor jets or the fuel supply line to the carburetor. The tank vents and fuel selector valve showed no anomalies that would have prevented normal operation.

In gauge testing, the left tank gauge stuck at three gallons when fuel was introduced and stayed there as the quantity was changed. The left gauge assembly was corroded. The right tank gauge was accurate.

The NTSB determined the probable cause to be the pilot's inadequate fuel management, which resulted in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power. The inaccurate fuel gauge was listed as a contributing factor.

The finding follows a familiar division in how investigators treat fuel exhaustion events. The pilot's fuel management is named as the cause, while a defective instrument is recorded as contributing. A gauge that sticks at a plausible value is more dangerous than one that reads zero, because it supports a decision to keep flying without prompting a second check.

For owners and maintenance providers of older piston aircraft, the case shows why direct-reading gauges are an inspection item in their own right and not a fixture to be assumed accurate. Corrosion in a gauge assembly is not visible from the cockpit, and a stuck needle can look normal. Two independent sources of fuel quantity, such as a visual tank check and a tracked fuel-burn calculation, only protect the flight if both are actually used and reconciled before departure.

The report names no further regulatory or maintenance action, so the record stands as the NTSB's probable-cause determination and the gauge test results.