Ukraine's Military Intelligence: Russia Bans Jet Fuel Exports, Imports 70,000 Tonnes of Jet A-1 via Shadow Fleet Tankers

Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) reported that sustained Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil-refining infrastructure have cut domestic jet fuel production, prompting Moscow to impose a temporary ban on aviation fuel exports and to seek foreign Jet A-1 imports. HUR said the shortage stems from Russia's need to intensify air attacks on Ukraine while also sustaining civilian aviation.

HUR documented that three shadow fleet tankers delivered a combined 70,000 tonnes of Jet A-1 to Russian ports in August 2026. ASTORIA, a Russian-flagged vessel sanctioned by the UK, Ukraine, Australia, the EU, Switzerland and Canada and commanded by Captain Mikhailovskiy Andrei Petrovich, delivered nearly 11,000 tonnes from Ulsan, South Korea, to Vladivostok in early August, ordered by JSC "Independent Oil and Gas Company," which is under Ukrainian sanctions and supplies LLC "TZK-AERO," a firm fulfilling government contracts for Russia's armed forces and the FSB. HANNA (Panama-flagged, Captain Gagan, an Indian national) and CAPIBARA (Indonesia-flagged, Captain Refly Johnny Sumual, an Indonesian national) — both under Ukrainian sanctions — together delivered nearly 59,000 tonnes from Egypt's El Dekheila port to the JSC "Petersburg Oil Terminal" in August 2026, involving Russian firms LLC "KONTUR SPB" (under EU and Swiss sanctions, which also supplies Russia's Ministry of Defense) and LLC "UMF agent." The UAE-based Caliph Energy Trading FZE was said to be involved in the South Korean supply chain.

HUR said Jet A-1 is compatible with Russian military aircraft including the MiG-29, Su-34, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-57, Su-24M and Tu-95MS, and can fuel Geran-4 and Geran-5 attack UAVs powered by Telefly TJ2000A turbojet engines or their Russian-made TRD-2000 copies. It also documented that Russian Il-76MD-90A transport aircraft, equipped with PS-90A-76 engines, are already using Jet A-1 instead of the manufacturer-recommended TS-1 fuel. HUR stated it has established the full geography of foreign aviation fuel supply routes and the maritime logistics schemes involving shadow fleet tankers, foreign-national captains, and companies linked to Russia's Ministry of Defense.

This case illustrates how refinery disruption can cascade into fuel substitution across both civil and military aviation, with a single grade like Jet A-1 bridging supply gaps for aircraft normally specified on other fuels. When a domestic refining base is degraded, operators reach for whatever compatible fuel is available, even when it departs from manufacturer recommendations, as documented with the Il-76MD-90A's use of Jet A-1 instead of TS-1.

The shadow fleet mechanism — sanctioned tankers, third-country flags, foreign-national masters, and layered corporate intermediaries in the UAE, South Korea and Egypt — mirrors patterns already familiar from crude and refined product sanctions evasion, now applied to jet fuel. It depends on port and terminal operators in exporting countries being willing, knowingly or not, to load cargo destined for sanctioned counterparties.

What happens next depends on whether the countries of origin — South Korea and Egypt — and flag states Panama and Indonesia respond to the named vessels, IMO numbers and companies with their own port or sanctions enforcement action. HUR's disclosure of specific tax identification numbers for the Russian buyers gives other governments a concrete basis to act, if they choose to.